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Abstract
This paper draws upon symbolic interactionism in order to assess and discuss the findings
from a longitudinal, single sector, case-based analysis of information system strategy (ISS)
formation within two public sector institutions - institutions that are often characterised as
bureaucratic in form, and culture. Each case acquired sought large, complex applications
off-the-shelf that required customisation. These are discussed as configurational
technologies.  The research has been informed by differences in perspective about the nature
of ISS formation as reported in the literature - with discussions of ISS often portrayed in bi-
polar terms; e.g. ISS as either planned or emergent. Literature suggests that the greater the
sectoral stability, and the more oriented towards bureaucracy the institutional form, the more
likely ISS planning will be formal - as opposed to emergent or evolutionary for example.
First, an argument is presented against the logic of bi-polarity that is evident in many
debates about ISS. Second, a case is made for the use of interactionist thinking as a means of
better understanding the political processes that shape ISS formation. From symbolic
interactionism, we utilise concepts of social worlds, trajectories, and boundary objects.
Findings from the empirical study are presented, from which the discussion focuses upon the
social shaping of trajectories, and the politics of configuration as constituents of the complex
practice of ISS formation.
Keywords
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1. Introduction
This paper reports upon research looking at information systems strategy (ISS) formation in
institutional settings that can be described as highly bureaucratic, with rigid hierarchies, and
the potential for autocratic behaviour – the UK Police Service - where the environment is
relatively stable. It is argued that ISS may be more appropriately understood social shaping
through interaction, where information technology, and organisation based practice are
mutually constitutive (Mackenzie & Wajcman, 1999). It is neither information, nor
technology, nor organisational context, nor people alone that  determine 'an outcome' -
instead, we believe that it is through the mutual interaction of these areas, which are
inseparable, that futures are shaped.
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2. An Interactionist Perspective
ISS is distinguished from general business strategy through being specifically concerned with
strategy related interactions and interpretations surrounding information technologies -
strategy as practice (Jarzabowski, 2003). Views that take for granted the existence of a
'strategy process' that has universal recognition, and acceptance within an organisational
setting are to the detriment of focussing upon the social practices surrounding the
development and application of technology strategy (Coombs et al, 1992). Studies arguing
that ISS formation comprises activity that is embedded within the wider social discourses that
take place as part of organisational life (Salmela et al., 2000) have become more numerous.
Nonetheless, research suggests that bureaucratic, or even autocratic, contexts may be more
likely to exhibit formal ISS planning (e.g. Peters, Heng, & Vet, 2002).
This paper draws symbolic interactionism, which is valuable in aiding both exploration, and
subsequent reporting, of the uncertainty and unpredictability inherent in technological change
- of which ISS formation is an important aspect. Symbolic interactionism, from an
organisational perspective, is concerned with the way in which meanings are constructed and
reconstructed through workplace interactions between people, in specific contexts. This
means that it is not purely focussed upon human interaction, but rather, the interactions
between people in situated practice, where technology is present and where technological
possibilities are shaped. Three premises underpin this view of interactionism (Blumer, 1969;
Gopal & Prasad, 2000). Firstly, that actions are based upon meanings that people have
derived from the situation. Secondly, that the meanings associated with social and non-social
objects or symbols arise through interactions between people, and finally, that these
meanings may be reconstructed as people continually interpret and reinterpret the developing
situation. This interpretive flexibility, which surrounds the application and usage of
information technologies in organisations (Williams & Edge, 1996), undermines the
credibility of realist approaches to ISS which assume unitary, and consensual viewpoints
amongst people at work.
In the light of this, three concepts are used to shape the discussion: social worlds, trajectories,
and boundary objects (see for example, Garrety & Badham, 2000). 'Social worlds'
acknowledges the multiple meanings surrounding technologies-in-use as well as
technologies-under-consideration. Looking at roles is one means of distinguishing between
groups of people who share certain sets of meanings, access to/use of artefacts, and areas of
activity (Gopal & Prasad, 2000). 'Roles' reflect "the socially defined expectations of
behaviour for individuals in particular social positions", and providing, "individuals with a
complex set of identities, which become the source for individual interpretations of social
situations "(ibid. p.514). Examples of ways in which 'roles' may be differentiated include:
hierarchy, status, expertise, interest, affiliation, and association.
The concept of trajectories can be subject to misinterpretation. It does not (in our usage)
imply inevitability of outcome. Nor does it infer that the presence of specific factors will
determine an inevitable outcome, or that a particular path of activity will continue in a
foreseeable manner. Instead, the concept draws our attention to the evolution of phenomenon
over time, and to the interactions contributing to the shaping of the phenomenon. In ISS
formation, related activity may incorporate planning, use of analytic frameworks, and even
software - all of which may be considered as trajectory schemes (Garrety & Badham, 2000).
Such schemes "may shape the trajectory, but they do not constitute its totality... It is the
interrelationships between schemes and the contingencies that occur along the way that
constitutes the politics of the project" (ibid. p.106, original emphasis). This draws attention to
the interactions shaping phenomena over time.
Keith .S.Horton ISS & Configurational Technologies
Finally, the concept of boundary objects refers to "anything that can be indicated, anything
that is pointed to or referred to" (Blumer, 1967, p10). Typically, these can be categorised into
physical (artefacts, people), social (work-groupings, experts), and abstract objects (theory,
power relations). However, objectification must not become the focus of the exercise, as this
would be to the detriment of understanding socio-technical interactions and multiple
meanings.
3. Empirical Study - Context & Method
The authoritarian top-down structure of UK Police Forces has been categorised as highly
bureaucratic (Loveday, 1993), which is why they were chosen as a venue for investigating
ISS formation. Interpretive in-depth case studies are recognised methods for conducting IS
research (Darke et al, 1998), with the longitudinal, cross-case comparative analysis covering
the period 1994 to 1998. Data collection involved a number of methods, principally: fifty
four in-depth semi-structured interviews of 2 hours duration on average, numerous on, and
off-site informal conversation, participation, collection of documentation produced by the
people involved, and collation and analysis of secondary materials produced outside of the
direct areas of study. Key themes were developed having abstracted a range of issues from
data coded with the aid of a software tool – NUD*IST.
We are acutely aware of the sectoral distinctiveness of the cases. However, the intention is
not to develop generalisations to other contexts, but instead to focus upon developing analytic
propositions to a wider body of theory (Walsham, 1995). The anonymity of each Police Force
has been preserved, as has that of the interactors.
3.1 Case A
This police force was responsible for policing a city and a large area of surrounding
countryside. Prior to 1993, the IT infrastructure was generally poor, having been starved of
development following the installation of a command and control system in 1983. Staff in the
Force had access to the few national IT systems that existed, but otherwise were dependent
upon stand-alone PC based systems.
At the end of May 1993 a new Deputy Chief Constable arrived, and ordered the IT
Department to prepare a specification to acquire a range of IT applications with a view to
transforming the IT capability of the Force. The aim was to acquire off the shelf applications
as far as was possible in order to reduce delay in implementation, and cost, as far as possible.
At a meeting in mid-1993, the new Deputy Chief Constable referred to the need to have a
strategy for IS in the Force. The development of an operational requirement for a new system
was seen by those involved as just that, the development of an IS strategy. An operational
requirement was drawn up by a group consisting of two mid-ranking officers and the
Computer Manager. This group were in continual contact with the deputy Chief Constable,
both through formal fortnightly meetings, but also through informal discussion on a
sometimes daily basis. This informal communication took place more frequently between the
Deputy Chief Constable, an Inspector and the computer manager; it was these three people
who were perceived to be the main people responsible for developing the IS requirements.
The operational requirement was a three page document, and set out the current situation in
the Force together with what was required in broad terms. As one person involved in this
process commented, "we deliberately left it open so that when we are in the phase of the
project where we are ready to look at what personnel system, we can then say 'right, what is
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the best that is round just now', and not say 'well four years ago we signed up to get that and
really it has been overtaken .. so we tried to keep our options as flexible as we possibly can  ..
not without heartache because the industry has found it difficult, they want to speak about
deliverables and signing off parts of the contract".
This operational requirement was couched in broad terms, and did not give detailed
requirements beyond the required application titles. The rationale behind this was expressed
as follows: "give the expert the problem and let him come up with the solution, don't give the
expert the solution because you will get what you asked for".
A supplier, who was an international IT vendor, was chosen following a competitive
tendering process. All except one of the software applications to be adopted were already in
existence, although each would require some customisation for the Force. The one
application that was bespoke, a command and control system, was delayed when a senior
police officer decided after the contract had been signed to standardise the Force on Windows
NT, rather than continue to use Unix - which had been the intended operating environment.
The supplier contracted to provide 'best of breed systems', a term which provided the Police
team with an area for debate. During 1995 and 1996, as applications came to be considered,
the Police team demanded best of breed systems at that point in time, and not what was best
of breed when the contract was signed in February 1994.
A project management board was set up in 1994 to oversee the project, and this met every six
months for three years. The meetings were not documented in anyway, and were regarded as
'rubber stamping' exercises by those involved. The project formed the basis for IS
development in the Force between 1994 and 1998. An acronym for the system was devised,
but a view expressed by many staff was of it as, "the Deputy's IT project". Most of those
closely involved were of the view that the project was the strategy, and vice versa. Among
other senior Officers opinion varied; namely that there was not a written ISS as such, just a
shopping list of applications, progress towards which had in their view been determined and
driven by the deputy Chief Constable. However, as one of the Officers involved in
developing the operational requirement commented, in 1996, when considering ISS, "it's all
in our heads, we don't have time to sit down and write a strategy". In 1998, another member
of that group observed that, "we don't have as such a strategy document that we can hand
out, we are working to the philosophy of strategy rather than to the word of it..... So .. the
documentation, there isn't a lot of it, we tend to be working by 'hmmm that sounds a good
idea let's try it and see'".
3.2 Case B
The second case study, Force B, also covers a city, together with a large area of countryside,
which includes several large towns. The technological infrastructure in 1993 was seen as a
significant factor in spurring the development of ISS, in that the lease for the mainframe
based system was due to expire in 1995 after some 15 years of usage. The people with
influence over ISS in 1993 comprised a small group of police officers within the IS
Department, and a civilian IS Manager (who had no authority initially within the hierarchy).
The executive level were perceived as disinterested in IS, with no champion for IS.
The common view of those spoken with was that the concept of IS strategy only came to be
considered by Police Forces in the early 1990s following the publication of a series of Home
Office circulars and Audit Commission papers on strategy and IT. These factors, together
with inspection visits by the Inspectorate, were said to have ‘concentrated the mind’ of many
senior staff.
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In 1993, the IS Manager suggested that they should consider developing an ISS for the next
few years. As one of the Officers in the Department noted, "we never had a strategy that has
been documented and stated in the past, it evolved through a series of separate developments
and it is only now that we are trying to pull them together".
In the IS department, ISS development was seen as a response to the ending of the mainframe
lease in April 1995. Viewed in combination, these factors were said to have highlighted to
the senior staff in the IS department that they needed to develop an ISS. Other senior officers,
outside of the IS department, seemed unaware of the lease expiry, or were dismissive of it as
a stimulant to ISS. A common view expressed was that the existing systems were in a mess,
and that it was about time that something was done about them. The following comments
from a senior officer reflect the views expressed by many others, "you only have to look at
the hotchpotch of different computer systems that we've got, that we've built up over the years
to realise that this is how to build up an information gathering system when you hadn't really
thought about what you want to achieve in the first place. I mean, it's a dogs breakfast".
In 1994 a project board was set up to monitor the ISS. Some senior police officers, generally
those with operational responsibilities, viewed this as a necessary device to monitor the
project given the poor track record in delivering IT projects in the past. Some of those
officers with greater  responsibility for IT viewed the project board as signifying a lack of
trust in their ability to deliver. A viewpoint more widely shared was that such procedures
were necessary to satisfy the expectations of external agencies, such as the Inspectorate and
the Audit Commission. In 1994, it was generally agreed that for an IS development to be
accepted, there must be a strong emphasis upon assisting operational officers. The most
senior officer on the project board summed up what he was seeking, "you build up your IT
strategy by saying 'what is the bloody strategy of the Police Force, what actually are we here
for', We're here, I think, to lock up bad people, look after good people, and keep order on the
street. We do that by getting the maximum resources employed at the sharp end by keeping
paperwork and bureaucracy to a minimum, by using civilians at every possible post we have
and by denying Police officers every excuse you can find to come in out the rain and that sort
of thing. You then develop your IT strategy around that philosophy".
At this point, members of the project board envisaged ISS as a five year plan, although as
was noted, "I would think that every year you would want to stop and reassess your .. not
change direction but perhaps the course, because perhaps what someone asks for now is not
technically feasible but in two years time it may well be, so you've got to have the flexibility
in the strategy to deal with that ".
By 1995, most people were reassured that the documented ISS had been thoroughly thought
through, and that it reflected trends in industry. The executive level officers reassured
themselves of this by engaging a nationally known firm of IT consultants to provide a review
on the work undertaken. Following this, a request for expressions of interest in supplying the
required applications was then sent out. Following submissions from 12 companies, a
shortlist of three possible suppliers was drawn up by the IS manager and several senior police
officers. Following a short series of meetings between members of the Project Board and the
shortlisted companies during May and June 1995, a firm was appointed as the lead supplier.
In September 1995, a contract was signed for the delivery of ten applications and a new data
network. The budget for hardware and software was £3.3 million, with a further £500,000
being allocated for the network. The applications were not bespoke, but did require
customisation.
1996 and 1997 were spent working with the suppliers in developing the new applications and
preparing for implementation. The attention give to other areas of IS were minimal, and the
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IS manager found it increasingly difficult to gain acceptance for the view that IS
development needed to be monitored on an ongoing basis. In the view of senior managers,
once a contract had been signed with the supplier, it was a question of sitting back and
waiting for the systems to arrive. During this time, periodic updates were submitted to the
Project Board by the IS manager, although the meetings were seen as uneventful and
unproductive.
Between the May 1996 and July 1998, five software applications were implemented in the
Force as part of the ISS, these being crime recording, crime reporting, criminal intelligence,
personnel, and command & control. In addition to a new wide area network, approximately
700 personal computers were installed. Progress in implementing ISS was perceived to be
good, although the envisaged timescale had slipped due to the diversion of resources into
planning for a large-scale, and unforeseen event taking place in the Force area.
4. Discussion
First, we consider the trajectory of what we terms ISS, and the way in which the shaping of
this area of practice was subject to a wide range of interactions. Second, we discuss the
politics of configurations; the ways in which people work to get technologies to 'fit' their
organisational settings can be conceived as configuring of technology with institution
specific structures, methods, requirements (Williams, 1997).
4.1 The Shaping of Trajectories
Each case ended up with new information technologies in place - an array of artefacts and
software embedded within social and work practices that was unique to each case situation.
Both cases had bought software that consisted largely of pre-existing applications that
required customisation, becoming complex configurational technologies (Williams, 1997)
that reflected the socially specific context. The interactors with whom we spoke variously
referred to the trajectories in terms of either information technology strategy, or information
system strategy. However, the point of concentrating upon the notion of trajectory is that it
focussed attention on 'strategic' initiatives not so much as new areas of activity, but rather as
continuations of practices surrounding IT within each of the cases. The idea of trajectory
therefore encouraged consideration of the antecedents of the initiative in focus, as well as at
the socially situated nature of the practice.
In both cases, the symbolism of earlier IT 'disasters' from the 1970's and 1980's, still
resonated strongly with staff and could be seen as primary boundary objects. As a senior
officer discussing earlier IT initiatives, in Case A, commented that, "it was an absolute
disaster and did not work .... I’m just glad it wasn’t me”. In both cases, these 'disasters' acts
as boundary objects, with espoused meanings partially shared and partially divergent
amongst groups. The divergence was evidenced through additional meanings that different
groupings discussed. For example, in all three cases, operational (uniform patrol/detective)
officers tended to discuss the earlier technology 'disasters' as representing what happens
when non-operational police officers are put in charge of such areas. As a senior officer, this
time in Case B, reflected, "I mean I remember how we got to be the way we are and it was all
to do with money being available, money being available quickly .. 'we've got to spend that
money, let's get something on board here' ... pressures from persuasive personalities within
the organisation can result in them having some sort of stand alone computer system which
doesn't merge in with the strategy that we're operating on". Alternatively, non-operational
police officers who were involved with IT in each case tended to view the earlier 'disasters' as
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reflecting what happens when there was no clear strategy, implicitly justifying their own
contributions to the ongoing IT initiatives.
In each of the cases, 'the IT strategy', or 'the IS strategy' were terms discussed by almost all
those spoken with, and the ideas captured by such terms could be seen to act as primary
boundary objects in each case. These boundary objects seemed to provide the impetus for the
sustaining of the trajectory - the terms, and the meanings that they symbolised, provided
some identity for the trajectory, whilst the associated socially located practices constituted
the shaping of each case  study's trajectory. The trajectory of practices in each of the cases
differed in terms of the formality of the 'strategy' practices. According to a senior officer in
case A, "it's all in our heads, we don't have time to sit down and write a strategy".
In contrast to this, in Case B, developed considerable IT strategy documentation through a
lengthy series of formal planning, and project management meetings - with these formalised
practices constituting readily identifiable trajectory schemes, shaping the trajectory.
However, it was not that these more formal trajectory schemes were not so much lacking in
case A, but rather that they each had a different form of trajectory schemes in place. In case
A, there existed very small groups of people (at first, four people, and from 1995, three) who
were perceived, by themselves and 'outsiders' to each grouping, as being at the centre of the
IT initiatives. These small groupings met frequently (sometimes on a daily basis), but
informally - and in each cases, these series of informal meetings constituted trajectory
schemes just as much as the more formal practices in Case B. Though both sets of practices
were influential aspects of the social practices shaping the trajectories of the respective IT
initiatives, irrespective of the degree of formality. This accords with the findings of other
researchers who have noted the significance of formal and informal political practices in ISS
formation (Sillince & Mouakket, 1997).
As a final observation in this area, it is worth noting that these trajectory schemes also acted
as boundary objects for the interaction between each case and external institutions tasked
with auditing and inspection. Staff in Case B were quite open that the use of formal planning
meetings and project management methods was a means of ensuring favourable comment
when audited/inspected. Similarly, staff in case A bemoaned the fact that they were
repeatedly criticised for the lack of such formality, irrespective, in their view, of the success
of less formal practices. Staff in case A adopted more formal practices, in 1997, but as one
senior member of staff commented, "we were supposed to be looking at following PRINCE,
but it is very much in name only, we're certainly not doing all the documentation. .... We don't
have any methodology really, we just have to get on with it". It would be easy to dismiss such
attempts to incorporate formality as a facade, or mock bureaucracy (Gouldner, 1954).
However, the meanings derived from activities of external bodies seemed influential, and
reinforced the view that interaction cannot be isolated from the wider sphere of public sector
activity.
4.2 Strategic Practice and the Politics of Configuration
ISS formation in these cases reflected aspects of configuring technical artefacts with social
processes, work related structures, and requirements (amongst other things). This configuring
depended upon interactions, with power relations and political practices being inseparable
from the institutional life within which such activity occurred (Knights & Murray, 1994;
Sillince & Mouakket, 1997; Garrety & Badham, 2000). Our discussion of interaction in this
section has been informed by focussing upon the nature of, and interaction between roles and
boundary objects. We have chosen this as an area of concentration because of the potential
for variance in interpretation surrounding boundary objects.
Keith .S.Horton ISS & Configurational Technologies
Several significant roles were identified across the cases that were closely associated with the
respective major IT initiatives, these being primary boundary objects. We also identified
secondary boundary objects within the trajectory of the initiatives. For example, in each case,
specifications of requirements, and eventually contracts were issued. In case B there was a
detailed specification of requirements, something seen as important by the civilian IT
manager overseeing this area of activity. Cases A had a much briefer, and more general
specifications of requirements. One outcome of this, was that a contract was agreed with the
supplier that offered considerable scope for interpretation as to exactly what would be
delivered. This lack of specificity was of considerable concern to those less directly involved
with the  IT initiatives, who perceived this as a position of weakness for the Force, but
strength for the supplier.
In each case there existed project Boards that were nominally supposed to oversee the major
IT initiatives. In terms of the interactions associated with both primary and secondary
boundary objects, there were three aspects of roles that we noted as significant. These were,
position in the hierarchy, perceived level of interest in IT, and perceived level of expertise in
IT. The mix of these three elements differentiated a number of roles that appeared to be
influential. As expected in a quasi-militaristic hierarchy, rank mattered. Cases A had very
senior officers who were perceived to be both interested, and IT 'experts' by other police
officers. As one senior officer observed regarding the chief officer, "... and I have to say that
many of us were quite shocked by some of his radical views on matters particularly in
association with technology, and the fact that he conversed as someone with knowledge,
which we'd never been used to, because we'd only been used to talking to people outside".
This individual provided a strong impetus in driving the IT strategy. IT strategy was not
documented, and staff expressed reservations about what would happen if the individual left
the organisation. Staff were appointed project boards by the Chief officer driving the process.
Not only did this provide opportunities for inclusion, but in case A in particular, several
senior officers expressed the view that these project boards had been constituted in such a
way as to exclude them from airing their views. Many senior staff commented adversely
upon the apparent lack of strategic thinking about what was required, exasperated by the
limited opportunities for senior staff to comment upon IT developments. In terms of power
relations, this could be seen as exercising power through limiting participation as much as
through managing decision making (Lukes, 1974; Hardy, 1996). These areas of practice
constituted aspects of the configuring of the social and the technical. The political dimensions
of interaction ensured that in case A, what transpired (i.e. the trajectory) reflected the direct
input of a small minority of staff, with the drive of a senior stakeholder maintaining the
impetus for IT developments. The outcome was a perception of technology being imposed. In
case B, practice had greater formality, and was less obviously driven by any one individual,
although the outcome was of technology being widely anticipated.
5. Conclusion
Whilst each of the cases ended up with 'new' systems in place, the practice surrounding the
trajectory of each differed. Complex technology needs are rarely satisfied by off-the-shelf
packaged solutions, but instead are particular configurations of technologies which reflect the
socially and historically situated nature of the proposed usage (Fleck, 1993). Echoing Voss
(1988), ISS formation in these cases constituted part of the configuring process, during the
course of which people shape, and are shaped by, technologies that they endeavour to fit with
their context. Findings do not appear to support the view that particular types of ISS
formation (e.g. formal, emergent, etc.) can easily be associated with this particular form of
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organisation. The trajectory of ISS formation can be considered a part of the configuring of
the social and the technical in context. It was through focussing upon interactions that the
complexity of practices surrounding that we term ISS formation were made more evident,
and in particular the political complexity and variances in perspective. Following Smirisch
and Stubbart (1985) we can see this as contributing to 'organisation making', that is, a part of
the ongoing, everyday social practice that forms an important part of what we come to know
as ISS formation in an organisational setting.
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